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Bioethics and Law in the United States:  A Legal Process Perspective 
Charles H. Baron 
Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, USA 
 
Abstract:  An analytical exposition of the law regarding a patient’s “right to die” as it has 
developed in the United States over the last 30 years provides an exemplar overview of the 
variety of legal mechanisms that American legal institutions can and do bring to bear to deal 
with the challenges posed by new developments in medicine and the biosciences.  Opposing 
“pro-life” and “pro-choice” ideological and political forces have been channeled through the 
federal and state legislative, judicial, and executive branches, where the various legal actors have 
developed legal principles that so far provide patients with a right to refuse any form of life-
prolonging treatment while denying them (in all but one state) the right to physician-assisted 
suicide.  The tension between these forces continues to exist, and the law is in a constant process 
of change. 
 
1. Introduction 
  
 Over the last few decades, America has served in the avant-garde of the effort to develop 
new law to respond to the challenges presented by rapid advances in medicine and the life 
sciences.  A meaningful substantive overview of all these developments cannot be provided in a 
short essay.  First, the areas of challenge are numerous, cover a broad range, and are ever-
growing.  They include, but are not limited to, such issues as patients’ rights, abortion, organ 
transplantation, fetal and embryonic research, stem cell research, genetic research and therapy, 
etc.  Second, the legal system of the United States is multi-layered and complicated.  Legal 
regulation may take the form of laws made by state and local governments as well as the federal 
government, and they may be issued not only by legislatures, but also by administrative agencies 
within the executive branch, and they may be developed by the state and federal judiciary who 
interpret state and federal constitutional provisions and apply principles of judge-made common 
law.  Thus, I will provide here an overview of only one (and one of the earliest) of the areas of 
development of “Law and Bioethics” in the United States, in the hope that it will be valuable not 
only for its coverage of the substantive law in that area, but also for the aid it may offer as a key 
to understanding the way that the American legal process is able to respond to the challenges 
raised in all such areas.1
 
In the last thirty years, a body of law has developed in the United States that establishes 
for American medical patients what has come to be called “the right to die.” The high water 
mark of that development thus far was reached in the last decade of the Twentieth Century. In 
1990, the United States Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Department of Public Health, in which it recognized a federal constitutionally based right of 
patients to refuse unwanted life-saving medical treatment - including artificial nutrition and 
                                                          
1 For a broader and more detailed, although somewhat outdated, treatment of this same subject, see Charles H. 
Baron, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET BIOÉTHIQUE:  L’EXPÉRIENCE AMÉRICAINE (Economica 1997). 
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hydration.2 In 1994 the voters of the state of Oregon passed by initiative process America’s first 
(and still only) state law legalizing and regulating physician-assisted suicide.3 But today, the 
process of further development of the right to die seems to be stalled, and the law protecting this 
right is left at an awkward, unstable, and even dangerous stage. Beyond that, there are 
indications that some of the progress made in protecting patient autonomy in this area is in peril 
of being undone. “Pro-life” political forces are currently engaged, over a wide-range of issues of 
modern bioethics and medical ethics, in a reactionary effort to undo many of the legal trends of 
the last three decades and retard future development. In the larger context of current political 
tensions in the United States between protection of individual liberties and efforts to promote 
religious and moral conformity, it is unclear how the law will develop in the near future. 
  
2. Judicial Development of “The Right to Die.” 
 
 Tension between pro-life and pro-choice political forces in the United States has shaped 
development of “the right to die” from its beginning. The movement to improve the plight of 
terminally ill patients -- to prevent them from being forced by outdated laws to endure long 
periods of suffering and indignity as part of the dying process -- arose against the background of 
the effort to legalize abortion and of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 landmark decision in Roe v. 
Wade.4 When the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided the first of the right-to-die cases, In re 
Quinlan,5 in 1976, it was no surprise that recognition of such a right would come first from the 
courts of the state rather than from its legislature or its executive branch. The decision in Roe had 
heightened the level of political activism of right-to-life groups across the country. Elected 
officials were predictably wary of the price they might pay at the polls for appearing weak on 
issues of respect for human life in all its forms. Thus, it was natural that Karen Quinlan’s father 
should turn to the courts of his state to seek relief when his daughter’s physicians -- fearing 
prosecution for homicide or assisting suicide -- refused to remove life-support from his 22 year 
old daughter, Karen, who had been determined to be in a permanent vegetative state. Judges in 
New Jersey, like federal judges and judges in many other American states, are appointed to the 
bench and do not stand for popular election. As a result, they are not as vulnerable as legislators 
to the threat of political retribution. Moreover, the courts offered other advantages over the 
legislature as institutions for modifying the law to accommodate the pressures on society created 
by progress in medicine and biotechnology. Although, common law judges clearly “make law,” 
the tradition is for them to do so by incorporating values from, and building incrementally upon, 
judicial precedents established in earlier cases. And, in deciding the cases before them, they are 
expected to write opinions that explain their decisions in a fashion that limits, as much as 
possible, the rule justifying the result to only what is necessary to reach the decision on the facts 
of the particular case. Unlike legislators, they need not draft laws in broad, sweeping form and in 
a fashion which anticipates and accommodates all possible exceptions. They can make law 
tentatively. They can establish a rule in one case; broaden the rule in a later case if it is 
determined to have been fashioned too narrowly, limit it if it was stated too broadly, or overrule 
it altogether if the court concludes it to have been a mistake. In all of this, they are able to draw 
                                                          
2 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
3 Oregon Death with Dignity Act. 
4 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
5 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
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on the work of sister courts, state and federal, employing decisions of other jurisdictions as 
“persuasive authority,” building upon them by accepting what seems reasonable and modifying 
or rejecting what does not. As I have pointed out in an earlier article on this subject, it was in just 
this fashion that American courts dealt with the challenges of new technology in the Nineteenth 
Century: 
 
During the Nineteenth Century, when American society was challenged by the 
development of new technologies such as the railroad and the telegraph, it was the 
common law courts of the various states that crafted legal responses attempting to 
balance the various interests involved.  The justices of the state supreme courts 
worked together in developing a new body of common law to govern these new 
technologies.  They wrote opinions in which they claimed to be drawing their 
norms from basic values already recognized in past common law decisions in 
both America and England and to be applying those norms to the facts of the 
cases before them.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was one of the 
leading courts in this effort.  The Court’s Chief Justice, Lemuel Shaw, came to be 
called “America’s Greatest Magistrate” in recognition of his contribution to the 
framing of law in this area.  But justices from many courts, building on each 
other’s decisions, contributed to the establishment of these legal norms on a case-
by-case basis.6
 
 Beginning with the decision of the New Jersey court in Quinlan ,  American 
courts, in the last third of the Twentieth Century, engaged themselves in a cooperative 
effort to develop principles for providing patients with the power to control the timing 
and circumstances of their deaths. In Quinlan ,  the New Jersey court granted Karen’s 
father the authority as her guardian to exercise what they found to be her constitutionally 
based right to refuse treatment under her medical circumstances. But, it is important to 
note that the decision did not rest upon recognition of an absolute right to refuse 
treatment. Indeed, as the New Jersey court notes in its opinion, recognition of such a right 
would have been inconsistent with decisions it had rendered only a decade before in 
which it had authorized physicians to force blood transfusions upon Jehovah’s Witness 
patients who objected to such treatment on religious grounds.7 The court’s holding in 
Quinlan  was restricted to cases like Karen’s where medical treatment offered no hope 
of being restored to a meaningful “quality of life.” Her case was different from that of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, said the court, in that the latter were “most importantly [patients] 
apparently salvable to long life and vibrant health; - a situation not at all like the present 
case.”8 The driving factor in Quinlan  appeared to be the fact that allowing a patient in a 
permanent vegetative state to die was the reasonable and humane thing to do. In the end, 
the court did not even require that Karen Quinlan’s wishes be taken into consideration in 
deciding whether or not she should be removed from life support. Testimony that had 
been offered at trial of what she had told friends she would want if she were ever 
                                                          
6 Charles H. Baron, Normativité et Biomédecine aux Etats-Unis, in Brigitte Feuillet-Le Mintier (ed.), NORMATIVITÉ 
ET BIOMÉDECINE at 13, (2003). 
7 Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 661-62. 
8 Id. at 663. 
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permanently on life support was rejected by the court as being “without sufficient 
probative weight.”9 Instead of attempting to establish Karen’s wishes, the court gave 
discretion to her physicians to decide whether or not life support should be withdrawn - 
so long as that decision was agreed to by her guardian, her family, and a hospital ethics 
committee. 
 
 Quinlan ,  in many ways, represented an effort on the part of the medical profession to 
take back a freedom from regulation it had enjoyed prior to the advent of modern high-
technology medicine. When patients died at home, under the care of family physicians, and in a 
context that did not afford seemingly unlimited options for prolonging life, attending physicians 
regularly made decisions for patients and families that “enough was enough.” But by the 1960’s 
and 1970’s, hospital staff was being confronted with the need to make increasingly stark life and 
death decisions in a frighteningly public environment. The very recent history of legal treatment 
of abortion decision-making was not such as to inspire confidence that doctors could consider 
themselves immune from legal prosecution. In the wake of the Thalidomide abortion controversy 
in the United States, professional practices regarding abortion had come under public scrutiny 
and legal control had been tightened in many jurisdictions. The solution to this problem had 
come with the decision in Roe in 1973. On the basis of a “right to privacy” it had previously 
found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution,10 the Roe Court had delegated to the pregnant woman’s attending physician almost 
all aspects of the determination of whether or not an abortion could be performed. 
 
 In Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court essentially followed the lead of Roe. Where 
Roe had used the federal constitutional right to privacy to protect professional autonomy at the 
beginning of life, Quinlan used that right (and a right to privacy that the court found in the New 
Jersey Constitution as well) to protect professional autonomy at the end of life. Because the 
patient was in a permanent vegetative state, and there was no reasonable chance that medical 
treatment could restore her to a higher “quality of life,” the patient’s right to life was outweighed 
by her right to privacy. Thus, her physician could lawfully hasten her death by removing her 
from her ventilator so long as this was agreed to by her guardian, her family, and an appropriate 
hospital ethics committee. 
 
 In 1977, the year following Quinlan, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
rendered a decision in a case that was very like Quinlan in many ways but unlike it in significant 
respects as well, and the Massachusetts court extended the principles of Quinlan in some ways 
and restricted them in others. The case was Saikewicz v. Superintendent of Belchertown State 
Hospital.11  It was brought by physicians at a state hospital for the mentally retarded who were 
seeking permission to withhold chemotherapy treatment from a 67 year old, profoundly mentally 
retarded inmate who was terminally ill with cancer. Without chemotherapy, the patient would die 
of his cancer within weeks or months. With the treatment, the patient might live for as much as a 
year, but at the cost of the serious side effects of chemotherapy. A decision to treat him was 
complicated by the fact that his profound state of mental retardation would prevent him from 
                                                          
9 Id. at 664. 
10 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
11 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977). 
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understanding why he was being subjected to the discomforts of chemotherapy. It would also 
prevent him from enjoying the sense of hope that a competent patient might obtain from the 
sense that every effort was being made to defeat the disease. 
 
 The Massachusetts court, like the New Jersey court in Quinlan, provided the physicians 
with legal permission to withhold treatment. Like the Quinlan court, the Saikewicz court based 
its decision on the right to privacy (which it, like the New Jersey court, found in its state 
constitution as well as in the federal constitution), and it held that this right outweighed interests 
in preserving life in circumstances, like those in the case before it, where treatment could not 
significantly improve the patient’s “quality of life.” Thus, Saikewicz followed Quinlan and even 
extended its holding to apply to patients who were being treated for a terminal illness -- not just 
to patients in a permanent vegetative state. However, in other important respects, Saikewicz 
represented a significant break from Quinlan. Rather than empowering physicians to make 
decisions for incompetent patients (so long as the patient’s guardian, family members, and a 
hospital ethics committee agreed), the court held that physicians were bound to follow the 
wishes of the patient. The “informed consent” or “informed refusal” of the patient, and not 
professional discretion, were to govern. And where the power to consent or refuse could not be 
exercised by a patient because of mental incompetency, physicians looking for legal protection 
would be required to ask a court to decide what the patient would want for himself. “We do not 
view the judicial resolution of [the question] whether potentially life-prolonging treatment 
should be withheld from a person incapable of making his own decision [as] a `gratuitous 
encroachment’ on the domain of medical expertise,” said the court. “Rather, such questions of 
life and death seem to us to require the process of detached but passionate investigation and 
decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created. Achieving 
this ideal is our responsibility and that of the lower court, and is not to be entrusted to any other 
group purporting to represent the ‘morality and conscience of our society’ no matter how highly 
motivated or impressively constituted.”12
 
 Over the next decade, the courts of Massachusetts made good use of this mandate to 
further refine the “informed refusal” principles of Saikewicz. By the end of this process, patient 
autonomy would become the bedrock norm of “the right to die.” But Saikewicz, like Quinlan, 
had not itself recognized an absolute right of patients to refuse life-saving treatment. In 
Saikewicz, the court limited its holding to cases where treatment could be characterized as 
merely “life-prolonging,” rather than “life-saving.” The Massachusetts court claimed it was 
relying upon “a substantial distinction in the State’s insistence that human life be saved where 
the affliction is curable, as opposed to the State interest where, as here, the issue is not whether 
but when, for how long, and at what cost to the individual that life may be briefly extended.”13 In 
a series of cases decided from 1978 to 1980, the Massachusetts courts supplanted such “quality 
of life” factors with criteria based on the objective “intrusiveness” of the proposed treatment. 
Thus, in Lane v. Candura,14 a 77 year old woman was permitted to refuse a lifesaving 
amputation of her leg because “[t]he magnitude of the invasion proposed in this case is decisive 
in applying the balancing test.”15 And in the cases of Commissioner of Correction v. Myers16 
                                                          
12 Id. at 435. 
13 Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26. 
14 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978). 
15 Id. at 1233 n.2. 
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and In re Spring,17 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided that a patient could refuse 
life-saving kidney dialysis because such therapy was “intrusive.” Although dialysis did not 
“require the sacrifice of a limb or entail substantial pain,” said the Court, it was, nonetheless, “a 
relatively complex procedure, which requires considerable commitment and endurance from the 
patient who must undergo the treatment three times a week.”18 Finally, in 1986, in Brophy v. 
New England Sinai Hospital,19 the court reached the conclusion that even proof of objective 
“intrusiveness” should no longer be required as a condition for the exercise of the right of 
“informed refusal.” Mr. Brophy, a patient in a permanent vegetative state, had made very clear 
while mentally competent that, if he were ever forced to live on life support in an unconscious 
state, he would want someone to “just shoot me, pull the plug.” To comply with his wishes, his 
family asked to have him removed from all life support - including artificial nutrition and 
hydration. The court granted the family’s request despite the fact that Mr. Brophy was neither 
“terminally ill nor in danger of imminent death from any underlying illness” and despite the fact 
that nutrition and hydration might not be considered intrusive in any objective sense. It was 
enough, the court held, that Mr. Brophy would consider the treatment intrusive because it stood 
in the way of his dying with dignity. 
 
 These developments in Massachusetts were being closely observed by courts in other 
states including those of New Jersey. When, in 1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court was faced 
with In re Conroy20, its first “right to die” case since Quinlan, the court adopted most of the 
principal points of doctrine that had been developed in the courts of Massachusetts. The patient 
in that case, Claire Conroy, was a mentally-incompetent eighty four year old nursing home 
patient who was being kept alive by, among other things, artificial nutrition and hydration. “She 
suffered from arteriosclerotic heart disease, hypertension, and diabetes mellitus; her left leg was 
gangrenous ... ; she had [bed sores] on her left foot, leg, and hip; an eye problem required 
irrigation; she ... could not control her bowels; she could not speak; and her ability to swallow 
was very limited.”21 Believing that Ms. Conroy should be allowed to die, her guardian (who was 
also her nearest relative) applied to the courts for permission to have her removed from life 
support. Despite the fact that Ms. Conroy was not in a permanent vegetative state nor terminally 
ill, the court decided that she could be removed from life support if it could be proved that this is 
what she would have wanted if competent. The court admitted it had erred in Quinlan when it 
disregarded “evidence of statements Ms. Quinlan made to friends concerning artificial 
prolongation of the lives of others who were terminally ill.”22 And it made clear that it was 
placing no objective limits on Ms. Conroy’s right to refuse continued life support. “Ms. 
Conroy’s right to self-determination,” said the court, “would not be affected by her medical 
condition or prognosis.”23 Indeed, said the court, “a young, generally healthy person, if 
competent, has the same right to decline life-saving medical treatment as a competent elderly 
person who is terminally ill.”24
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979). 
17 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980). 
18 Myers, 399 N.E.2d at 457. 
19 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986). 
20 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). 
21 Id. at 1217. 
22 Id. at 1230. 
23 Id. at 1226. 
24 Id. 
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 By 1990, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided the narrow constitutional question 
presented to it in Cruzan,25  the Court could note that state supreme courts across the United 
States had made it the general law of the country that patients had a right to refuse any sort of 
medical treatment. By slow steps, on the facts of one case at a time, and by means of a 
cooperative dialogue, the courts had first recognized such a right only where the courts and the 
medical profession agreed that the decision seemed a reasonable one, but ended in protecting the 
autonomy of patients to make even choices that seemed “irrational.” As a capstone to this 
development, in 1992, in the case of In Re Hughes,26 the New Jersey Supreme Court took the 
long-overdue step of making its earlier case law regarding Jehovah’s Witnesses consistent with 
developments since Quinlan. In a decision that essentially overruled those earlier cases, the court 
stated: “[A] competent Jehovah’s Witness or person holding like views has every right to refuse 
some or all medical treatment, even to the point of sacrificing life. .. Should a patient decide, 
with full knowledge of the potential situation, to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment and the 
patient communicates this decision via clear and convincing oral directives, actions or writings, 
the patient’s desires should be carried out.”27
 
3. Legislative Procedures for Proxy Decision Making 
 
 While these legal developments were taking place in the courts of New Jersey and 
Massachusetts, there was, for many years, no action taken by the legislatures of those states. This 
was unfortunate. Although there are advantages to law-making by gradual judicial development 
of a body of precedent, there are, of course, advantages to law-making by legislatures. Such 
advantages are typically the correlatives of the advantages of law-making by courts. There are, 
for example, the obvious advantages of law-making by an elected body that can give the people 
what they want rather than what a court thinks they should want. There are the advantages of 
having general rules laid out in advance of the occurrence of problems so that the problems may 
be avoided. There are the advantages that stem from not having to justify law-making on the 
basis of principles of “reason” When law-making calls for the establishment of essentially 
arbitrary rules, e.g., rules of the road regarding right of way, speed limits, minimum 
requirements of age and competence for a driver’s license, etc., the job cannot easily be 
performed by a court. And there are many other advantages as well. In Conroy, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court explicitly noted some of these advantages. “Perhaps it would be best,” said the 
court, “if the Legislature formulated clear standards for resolving requests to terminate life-
sustaining treatment for incompetent patients. As an elected body, the Legislature is better able 
than any other single institution to reflect the social values at stake. In addition, it has the 
                                                          
25 Cruzan v. Director Missouri Dep’t of Public Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The court’s narrow holding in the case 
was that Missouri had not violated the U.S. Constitution by requiring proof of the wishes of a PVS patient at a level 
of “clear and convincing evidence” before artificial nutrition and hydration could be removed. 
26 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987). 
27 Id. at 1153. For a detailed discussion of the legal developments in the United States regarding Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and blood transfusions, see Charles H. Baron, Blood Transfusions. Jehovah’s Witnesses and the 
American Patients’ Rights Movement, 3 JOURNAL OF  CHINESE AND COMPARATIVE LAW 19 (2000) 
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resources and ability to synthesize vast quantities of data and opinions from a variety of fields 
and to formulate general guidelines that may be applicable to a broad range of situations.28
 
 By 1987, in the face of a continuing absence of “right to die” legislation in New Jersey, 
the state court felt obliged to take steps that might have been better left to the legislature. In the 
case of In re Peter29 the court noted with regret the absence of legislation providing for the 
execution of a “living will” - “a written statement that specifically explains the patient’s 
preferences about life-sustaining treatment.”30 Many other states, the court observed, had passed 
statutes recognizing the validity of “living wills” and prescribing procedures for their execution. 
“Unfortunately,” said the court, “the New Jersey Legislature has not enacted such a law.”31 New 
Jersey also had not enacted a health care proxy law - a type of statute, passed in many other 
states, that enabled patients to appoint health care agents empowered to make life-sustaining 
treatment decisions if the patients became mentally-incompetent. Despite the lack of such 
statutory authority, Hilda Peter, the patient in the case before the court, had executed a document 
purporting to appoint a friend as her agent to make health care decisions for her. The court 
decided to grant legal validity to the document. It did so by providing a strained construction to 
New Jersey’s general statute providing for the appointment of agents. “Although the statute does 
not specifically authorize conveyance of durable authority to make medical decisions,” said the 
court, “it should be interpreted that way.”32
 
 But, the court continued to make clear that it would prefer that the legislature play its 
proper role in law-making. In an effort to encourage action from the state legislature, the New 
Jersey court gave evidence of backing away from its reliance upon the right to privacy as its 
principal basis for the “right to die.” In 1985, in Conroy, the court held that the right to refuse 
artificial nutrition and hydration could be justified entirely upon common law principles of 
informed consent and refusal. There was no need, the court thought, to consider whether Ms. 
Conroy’s rights were protected as well by the federal and state constitutions. In 1987, in In re 
Farrell,33 the court held that a patient’s right to refuse treatment rested “primarily” on the 
common law. As a later court pointed out, these were decisions to “smooth the path for 
legislative action.”34 American legislatures have the power to overrule common law, but they do 
not have the power to override constitutional rights. Massachusetts and some other states that 
had earlier relied upon the right to privacy followed the New Jersey lead.35   In 1991, the New 
Jersey legislature finally enacted legislation providing for “advance directives for health care.”36 
Earlier, the Massachusetts legislature had passed legislation providing for the appointment of 
“health care proxies.”37 1n doing so, the two state legislatures brought their jurisdictions in step 
with the vast majority of American states. By 1994, 47 states had enacted some form of living 
                                                          
28 Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1220-21 (footnote omitted). 
29 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987). 
30 Id. at 426. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987). 
34 Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 27 (NJ. 1992) (Pollock, J. concurring). 
35 See, for example, Norwood Hospital v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1991). 
36 Advance Directives for Health Care, NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-53 to -78 (West 1996). 
37 HEALTH CARE PROXIES, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201 D (1996). 
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will legislation,38 and all but two states had passed some form of health care agency act.39 These 
statutes achieved progress of a sort that is difficult to work out on a case-by-case, common law 
basis. They laid out clear and precise general procedures for establishing the validity of living 
wills and for appointing health care proxy decision-makers. And, to deal with situations where 
patients failed to take advantage of living will or health care proxy laws before becoming 
incompetent, a growing number of jurisdictions also began to warn patients that, failing a choice 
on their part, health care proxies would be selected for them on the basis of criteria chosen by the 
legislature.40
 
 Some of the state statutes went beyond merely prescribing procedures for formalizing 
expressions of patient will. In such instances, tension could be generated between the courts and 
legislatures of the states. For example, in McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises,41 the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut found itself confronted with a statute in which the legislature seemed 
clearly to have eliminated a patient’s right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration.42 Mrs. 
McConnell, the patient in the case before the court, was a fifty-seven year old woman who had 
worked as a nurse in emergency medicine up until the time of an accident that had rendered her 
comatose. On the basis of her professional experience, she had communicated to her friends and 
family her firm wish never to be kept on any sort of life support in the event of permanent 
incapacity. Despite the clear language of statute, all of the judges of the Connecticut court held 
that Mrs. McConnell had a right to have artificial nutrition and hydration stopped. At least one of 
the justices would have decided the case on the basis of either the right to privacy (which would 
have overridden the statute) or the common law (which he argued had not been explicitly 
supplanted by the statute). A majority of the justices felt obliged to decide the case under the 
statute, but they did so only after giving the statute a strained interpretation that would avoid 
questions regarding the statute’s constitutionality. The court first noted how often it, like the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, had called upon its state legislature to take action in this area of 
the law. “When the legislature has attempted to respond to this urgent request for statutory 
assistance, we have an obligation to pursue the applicability of statutory criteria before resorting 
to an exploration of residual common law rights, if any such rights indeed remain.” The court 
then interpreted the statute to prohibit only cessation of spoon feeding and water provided by 
mouth. This interpretation, said the court, permitted a decision employing the statute and, at the 
same time, avoided the possibility that the statute might be found unconstitutional. Subsequently, 
the Connecticut legislature amended the language of the statute, not to overrule the McConnell 
decision, but rather to bring it into explicit conformity with the interpretation that the court had 
given it in that case. 
4. Physician-Assisted Suicide and Active Euthanasia 
 
                                                          
38 Alan Meisel, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 11.12 (1989 & 1994 supp. No. 2). 
39 Choice in Dying, 1991 REFUSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION, Intro - 2 (1994 update). 
40 Id. 
41 553 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1989). 
42 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ l9a-570 to -580d (West. Supp. 1977). 
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 Until 1986, all “right to die” decisions of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court were 
unanimous. In that year, in Brophy, three of seven justices wrote dissenting opinions.  One of the 
dissenting justices wrote: 
 
[The trial judge in this case] found that “Brophy’s decision, if he were competent 
to make it, would be primarily based upon the present quality of life possible for 
him, and would not be based upon the burdens imposed upon him by receiving 
food and water through a G tube, which burdens are relatively minimal.” . . . 
Suicide is primarily a crime of commission, but can, and indeed must, also be 
conceived of as an act of omission at times. See In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 228, 
231-232, 480 A.2d 93 (1984) (suicide can be committed by starvation [or 
dehydration]). If nutrition and hydration are terminated, it is not the illness which 
causes the death but the decision (and act in accordance therewith) that the illness 
makes life not worth living. There is no rational distinction between suicide by 
deprivation of hydration or nutrition in or out of a medical setting - both are 
suicide.43
 
Unlike Jehovah’s Witnesses refusing blood transfusions, Mr. Brophy had no objections to the 
form of treatment - there was nothing to indicate that he found artificial nutrition or hydration 
particularly horrific or that he would have refused them if there was hope of being restored to a 
normal, sapient existence. Unlike Mr. Saikewicz, Mr. Brophy had no objections to treatment 
because it was better to die sooner from a terminal disease by refusing burdensome treatment 
than to live a slightly longer life while suffering painful and disorienting side effects. Mr. 
Brophy’s objections were based on the fact that he would rather be dead than continue subsisting 
in a meaningless and undignified state that imposed pointless costs on his family and society in 
general. As the Brophy dissenters pointed out (in terms that anticipated those Justice Scalia 
would use in his concurring opinion in Cruzan44), it is impossible to differentiate this sort of 
“refusal of treatment” from physician-assisted suicide without a display of legal legerdemain and 
the use of legal fictions. Nonetheless, American courts have thus far resisted all efforts to have 
them take the next logical step and judicially extend the `right to die’ to include requests by 
terminally ill patients for physician assistance in hastening death by prescribing lethal 
medication that patients can use to end their lives at a time and in circumstances of their own 
choosing. 
 Three state appellate courts have so far ruled on this question under their state 
constitutions and the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In 1997, in Krischer v McIver;45 
the Florida Supreme Court overturned a lower court ruling that had held that a Florida statutory 
prohibition on assisting suicide violated the state’s constitutional provision protecting a right to 
privacy to the extent that the statutory ban prevented a competent, suffering, terminally-ill 
patient from obtaining assistance in hastening death from a willing physician. In reversing the 
lower court, the Supreme Court based its decision on acceptance of a conventional distinction 
between “active” and “passive” means of hastening death – finding the latter, but not the former, 
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to be constitutionally protected. The court expressed belief that clinging to the distinction was 
necessary to prevent a slide down a “slippery slope” to approving involuntary euthanasia and 
cited, as support for this, the conclusion of a 1994 New York Task Force on Life and the Law 
that proposed “a clear line for public policies and medical practice between forgoing medical 
interventions and assistance to commit suicide or euthanasia.”46 In 2001, in Sampson v. State,47 
the Supreme Court of Alaska also held statutory prohibitions on assisted suicide to be 
constitutional - even as applied to terminally ill patients seeking assistance from willing 
physicians. In that case, the court found that privacy rights explicitly guaranteed under the state 
constitution had been compromised, stating that “[t]o the extent that the . . . statute’s general 
prohibition of suicide prevents terminally ill patients from seeking a physician’s help in ending 
their lives, the provision substantially interferes with [patients’] general privacy and liberty 
interests, as guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution”48 However, the court concluded that the 
burden on such rights was justified by state interests in preventing abuses that might follow on 
approval of such “active” means of hastening death and, again, relied upon and reaffirmed the 
distinction between acts and omissions to act in causing death. In People v. Kevorkian,49 
decided in 2001, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected a physician’s claim that state and 
federal constitutional provisions required reversal of his second degree murder conviction arising 
from his use of active measures to hasten the death of a consenting, terminally ill patient. Again, 
the court justified denying constitutional protection based on a concern that “expanding the right 
to privacy would begin, as the steps in the progression of defendant’s argument supporting 
voluntary euthanasia clearly indicate, the slide down the slippery slope toward [involuntary] 
euthanasia.”50
 The U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on this matter in two companion cases in 1997. 
Washington v. Glucksberg51 was an appeal from a decision in which the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit had declared Washington’s statutory prohibition of assisted suicide (to the 
extent that it prohibited competent, terminally ill, suffering patients from obtaining medication 
that could be used to voluntarily hasten their deaths) to be unconstitutional under the Due 
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Vacco v. Quill52 was an appeal of a similar 
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit invalidating a similar New York 
law, but under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both decisions were 
overturned in the Supreme Court by a 9 to 0 vote. The result was complicated by the fact that, in 
addition to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the court in the two cases, five justices, 
Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer wrote their own opinions. A majority of the 
justices seemed agreed that the court’s decision in Cruzan was to be explained as not 
recognizing a fundamental right to die “deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy”53 
but rather resting merely upon long-standing principles of bodily integrity protecting individuals 
from unconsented-to touching. Because statutes prohibiting physician-assisted suicide do not 
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impinge upon the right to be free from such touching, the court held that such statutes are to be 
subjected to less strict constitutional scrutiny than laws that force treatment on patients, and it 
found that those statutes could be justified by a number of rational state interests, including 
concern that suicidal patients might be clinically depressed, that vulnerable populations of 
patients might suffer pressure or discrimination from family members and medical personnel, 
and that allowing physician-assisted suicide might lead to the practice of involuntary euthanasia. 
In part, the court seemed to rest its decision on the belief that legalization of physician-assisted 
suicide was made unnecessary by the fact that adequate palliation of suffering was available to 
terminally ill patients, and the court seemed to give legal sanction to practices such as “terminal 
sedation” (medicating suffering patients into unconsciousness, after which artificial nutrition 
hydration might be terminated) and use of Catholic doctrine regarding the principle of “double 
effect” to justify injecting painkillers in amounts high enough to hasten the death of suffering 
patients so long as the intent of the doctor is merely to suppress pain. 
5. Tensions and Dangers in the Current Doctrine 
 
 The reasoning of the decisions dealing with physician-assisted suicide do not bear close 
scrutiny. Under current law, positive acts, like switching off a ventilator, are treated as mere 
“omissions to act.” Physicians’ acts in hastening death with pain medication are considered not 
to be acts of homicide so long as the physician who prescribes the medication is thinking (while 
prescribing) that he or she is primarily trying to suppress pain and only incidentally shortening 
life. These conceptual oddities are defended as providing “bright line” distinctions between what 
is forbidden and what is permitted in ending the lives of terminally ill patients. But, there is little 
evidence that they work in practice. Even opponents of physician-assisted suicide admit the 
difficulty physicians presently have in understanding and applying current criteria for deciding 
what is lawful and what is not in hastening the death of patients.54 Moreover, experience over 
the years since Quinlan shows that grabbing at bright-line distinctions doesn’t keep us from 
sliding down slippery slopes. Quinlan’s recognition of the right of a patient in a permanent 
vegetative state to refuse (by proxy) an indefinite existence on a ventilator, for example, seems 
to be on the verge of becoming today’s right of any competent patient to hasten death by refusing 
to eat or to drink.55 Advocates of a bright-line distinction are continually forced to look for new 
stopping points. Yale Kamisar, who used to argue that respect for human life would be 
unalterably undermined if laws regarding homicide and assisted suicide were interpreted to allow 
patients to refuse life-prolonging treatment, now argues only against allowing exceptions for 
physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia.56
 
                                                          
54 See, for example, Katherine Foley, “Compassionate Care, Not Assisted Suicide,” in The Case against Assisted 
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American Journal of Law & Medicine 45 (2003). 
56 Compare Yale Kamisar, “Some Non-Religious Views against Proposed ‘Mercy-Killing’ Legislation,” 42 
Minnesota Law Review 969, 977 (1958) with Yale Kamisar, “Rise and Fall of the ‘Right’ to Assisted Suicide,” in 
The Case against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care, edited by Katherine Foley and Herbert 
Hendin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2002), 72-74. 
 12
 Attempting to cling to bright-line distinctions does not seem to offer us much protection, 
and it comes at significant cost. Denying physician-assisted suicide as an option to terminally ill 
patients means enforced suffering for many patients. If hastening of death is available only to 
those who can obtain it through refusal of life-prolonging treatment, such as cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation or artificial ventilation, then patients who do not need such treatment are required 
to soldier on. Opponents of physician-assisted suicide warn that the price of too much 
compassion for a particular suffering, terminally ill patient may be abuse of other patients and a 
general undermining of respect for human life. These seem to be empirical claims-appeals to 
laws of cause and effect. However, it is sometimes hard to know exactly what is being predicted. 
That doctors or relatives will not fully understand how to use the criteria for determining when it 
is all right, and when not, to assist a suffering patient to end his life? That they will make 
mistakes in determining the relevant facts? That they will. cheat (out of self-interest, on the basis 
of prejudice, and the like)? Or is it a more global claim that the bonds of civilization will be 
generally cast aside once our society no longer enshrines as an absolute principle the sanctity of 
human life? Whatever the precise import of the claims, they are serious and deserve to be taken 
seriously. They were, of course, taken seriously by the U.S. courts that gradually fashioned what 
has become the right to refuse life-prolonging treatment. At each stage, the courts recognized 
that respect for the rights of individual suffering patients required more than merely giving in to 
fear of the unknown. Taking tentative steps, the courts promulgated substantive standards and 
procedural protections that were designed to mitigate the risk of slippery slope problems while 
freeing palliative care practitioners to act with greater respect for patient autonomy and increased 
compassion for the plight of the terminally ill. 
 
 Would legalizing physician-assisted suicide make the risks any greater or more 
intractable? The patient who is considering a hastened death by refusal of life support is no less 
vulnerable to depression, coercion, prejudice, financial pressure, ineffective communication, 
mental incompetence, failure of adequate palliative care, impatience of medical personnel, or 
mistaken prognosis or diagnosis than the patient who is considering a hastened death by 
physician-assisted suicide. Indeed, as to some of these risks, legalization of refusal of treatment 
would seem more dangerous than legalization of physician-assisted suicide. Is a vulnerable 
patient more likely to succumb to a request that she commit suicide or to the statement, “You 
know, Mrs. Jones, maybe we’ve put you through enough. Maybe it’s time to think of giving up?” 
Are impatient or prejudiced medical personnel more likely to be tempted to cut financial and 
emotional costs by means of physician-assisted suicide or by terminating life-prolonging 
treatment that they can claim has become “medically inappropriate?” Ironically, there may be 
less slippery-slope basis for denying patients the option of physician-assisted suicide than for 
denying them the right to refuse treatment. At the very least, there is no more. 
 
 Despite the illegality of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, many American health 
care professionals admit to engaging in one or the other practice when they feel circumstances 
require it. Although the American Medical Association takes a public stand against physician-
assisted suicide,57 it seems opposed only to its legalization, not to its practice. Despite a number 
of articles reporting fairly widespread practice of physician-assisted suicide-some of them 
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published in the pages of its own journal58 -- the association has not taken steps to find out who 
these physicians are in order to have them disciplined Indeed, it has not even expressed shock to 
find that the practice is going on. Rather than being concerned with protecting society and 
patients from the evils of assisted suicide, the American Medical Association appears concerned 
to protect its members from the evils of legalization-the bad public relations or increased legal 
oversight that might result from an admission that doctors sometimes take positive steps to 
terminate the lives of suffering patients. Moreover, mercy killings by family members are 
regularly reported in the American press; many more most likely go unreported and undetected. 
Prosecutions are often dropped, grand juries do not indict, and trial juries acquit. When there are 
convictions, they are usually followed by light sentences. Overall, mercy killings receive 
increasingly lenient treatment. Judges and prosecutors express decreased willingness to pursue 
such cases because they view them more compassionately than they previously did and because 
of “lack of evidence, uncooperative family members, and juries’ reluctance to convict 
defendants.”59
 Maintaining the present legal regime unduly heightens the risk of deadly mistakes and 
abuse in the treatment of terminally ill patients. In the face of increasing sympathy for the plight 
of suffering patients, the legal system largely looks the other way when physicians—and even 
family members—assist in suicide. Of course, persons providing assistance have to keep in mind 
that there is always the chance that they could be caught and punished, and some argue that the 
threat of punishment provides a check against abuse sufficient to ensure that assistance in suicide 
and euthanasia will be employed in only the most compelling and meritorious cases. In the 1970s 
some commentators similarly argued that the threat of criminal punishment was enough to 
regulate decisions to withdraw life-prolonging treatment from terminally ill patients.60 However, 
American medicine has wisely abandoned the “slow codes” and secret do not resuscitate orders 
of days gone by in favor of open procedures for permitting patients to die without undergoing 
last-ditch efforts at resuscitation. Post hoc criminal review is a very rough tool for regulating 
such sensitive decisions—especially when both the life of the patient and the freedom and 
reputation of the actor are at stake. Criminal review comes too late to rectify errors and at a time 
when patients can no longer be interviewed as to whether steps were taken on the basis of their 
competent, informed, and voluntary consent. Leaving regulation to the possibility of post hoc 
criminal review also discourages honest communication among health care professionals and 
between professionals and their patients.61 It inhibits helpful professional consultations and the 
development of medical protocols. Fear of open discussion creates the possibility that 
physician’s orders or patient’s wishes will be misread.62 Making matters worse, the chilling 
effect of post hoc criminal review extends beyond the realm of technically illegal practices such 
as physician-assisted suicide. Among other things, physicians’ fear of appearing after the fact to 
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have intentionally hastened a patient’s death with morphine is a leading cause of undertreatment 
of pain in terminally ill patients.63
 
 The risk of deadly mistakes and abuse in the treatment of terminally ill patients is 
exacerbated in yet another way by the current regime. In attempting to maintain a bright-line 
distinction between physician-assisted suicide and refusal of life-prolonging treatment, the 
regime does not treat decisions opting for the latter as seriously as it should. Decisions like that 
in the Brophy case - to refuse treatment because life is no longer worth living - raise the same 
issues of patient autonomy and compassion toward suffering patients that are raised by 
physician-assisted suicide, and they face all the same risks of abuse and mistake. Yet the present 
regime categorizes them as mere determinations to “let nature take its course.” 
 
6. Statutory Responses to the Situation 
 
 The five justices who wrote individual opinions in Glucksberg all made clear that they 
were leaving the door open for a future case that might convince them that physician-assisted 
suicide should be constitutionally protected.  Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer suggested 
that such a case might be one that established the unavailability of adequate treatment for 
palliation of the pain and suffering of the terminally ill.  Justices Stevens and Souter argued more 
generally that new facts of other sorts relevant to the balancing of individual rights and state 
interests might lead them to reach a different result. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist responded 
to these opinions in a footnote 64 that suggested it was possible that future facts could lead to a 
different result in specific cases, he concluded his opinion for the Court by saying:  “There is no 
reason to think the democratic process will not strike the proper balance between the interests of 
terminally ill, mentally competent individuals who would seek to end their suffering and the 
state’s interests in protecting those who might seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure.  As 
the Court recognizes, states are presently undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of 
physician-assisted suicide and other related issues.  In such circumstances, ‘the . . . challenging 
task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding . . . liberty interests is entrusted to the 
“laboratory” of the states in the first instance.’”65
 
 The democratic process in the United States has, in fact, shown some slow progress in 
protecting the rights of terminally ill, mentally competent patients.  But it has been more 
obviously the arena for a hard-fought ideological battle in which there have been steps backward 
as well as forward.  Public opinion in the United States is increasingly favorable to allowing 
terminally ill patients the right to a physician-hastened death.  In 1947, 54 percent of respondents 
to a Gallup poll answered “no” when asked, “When a person has a disease that cannot be cured, 
do you think doctors should be allowed by law to end a patient’s life by some painless means if 
the patient and his family request it?”  Another 9 percent said “don’t know” and only 37 percent 
said “yes.”66  However, by 1973, these percentages were nearly reversed.  When asked the same 
question by Gallup in that year, 53 percent of respondents said “yes,” 7 percent were undecided, 
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and only 34 percent were opposed.67  Surveys conducted between 1988 and 1993 showed a 15 
percent gain in support for death with dignity laws.  In 1988, 58 percent of respondents answered 
“yes” to a Roper poll that asked, “When a person has a painful and distressing terminal disease, 
do you think doctors should . . . be allowed by law to end the patient’s life if there is no hope of 
recovery and the patient requests it?”  Only 27 percent of those polled said “no” and 14 percent 
were undecided.68  By 1990, a Gallup poll produced a 65 percent favorable response.69  In 1993, 
a Harris poll recorded 73 percent of respondents answering “yes.”70  And in 1996, a Gallup poll 
reported 75 percent.71  Nonetheless, because of strong and well-financed campaigns fought 
largely by religious groups opposed to legalization, the legislative process has shown itself slow 
to respond to public opinion. 
 
 In 1991, proponents of physician-hastened dying in the State of Washington bypassed 
their state legislature and went directly to the voters with an initiative proposition that would 
have legalized euthanasia by lethal injection.  The proposed law lost by a vote of 46 to 54 
percent.  In the next year, a similar initiative proposal was put to the voters in California.  In a 
battle which was hard fought and heavily financed, the proposal lost by the same margin.  
However, in 1994, voters in Oregon were offered an initiative proposition which proposed 
legalizing only physician-asssisted suicide and expressly prohibiting “lethal injection, mercy 
killing [and] active euthanasia.”72  Known as the “Oregon Death with Dignity Act,” the law was 
passed by a margin of 51 to 49 percent. Opponents of the law continued their battle against it, 
first by obtaining an injunction in federal court73 and, then, while the injunction held up the 
operation of the law, by arranging to put a repeal question before the voters in the 1997 election.  
In February of 1997, the injunction was lifted by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,74 
and, at the November election, the repealer was defeated by a vote of 60 to 40 percent.  Since 
1997, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act has operated without any of the dire consequences or 
abuses that had been predicted by its opponents.  By the end of the first year, even the strongest 
opponents of the act admitted that it was working in exemplary fashion.  The head of the Oregon 
Hospice Association, which had opposed the law, acknowledged that the act was “giving 
Oregonians one more option at the end of life.  It’s just one of many choices.”75  A Catholic 
priest in charge of health care ethics for Oregon’s Catholic hospital network said: “It’s not the 
harbinger of destruction that people thought it was going to be. . . .  We’d rather people didn’t 
choose it, but it challenges us to provide better care so they won’t choose it.”76
 
 The act permits terminally ill, adult Oregon patients to obtain a lethal prescription from a 
participating physician only so long as 1) the physician and a consulting physician confirm the 
patient’s diagnosis and the fact that he is terminally ill, 2) the physician and a consulting 
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physician determine that the patient is capable of competently making the request and that the 
patient’s judgment is not impaired by depression or some other psychiatric or psychological 
disorder (if there is doubt, the patient must be referred to psychiatrist or psychologist for 
counseling), and 3) the physician informs the patient of all feasible alternatives to assistance in 
dying, such as pain control and hospice care.  The patient must make a request in writing and 
make two oral requests at least 15 days apart.  All prescriptions written under the act must be 
reported to the Oregon Health Division.  Each year, the Health Division must report statistics in 
order to monitor the act’s operation.  In February 1999, the Oregon Health Division reported 
that, in the first year under the act, 23 terminally ill patients had been prescribed lethal 
medication, 15 had died after taking the medication, 6 had died from underlying illnesses, and 
two were still alive.  Comparison of the 15 cases with a selected group of control patients 
strongly suggested that “sex, race, urban or rural residence, level of education, health insurance 
coverage, and hospice enrollment” were not factors in whether patients received physician 
assistance in dying.  Ten of the 15 were under hospice care at the time of death, and three of the 
others refused it.  Only one patient gave “inadequate” pain control as a reason for requesting aid 
in dying.  The predominant reasons given were “loss of autonomy due to illness” and “loss of 
control of bodily functions.”77  The Oregon Health Division has continued to publish annual 
reports.78  Over the first six years of the acts operation, there was a significant increase in 
prescriptions issued (67 in 2003) and patients using physician-assisted suicide (42 in 2003).  But 
in the last three years, the numbers have held steady or decreased79 and the Health Division 
characterizes the numbers as still very small compared to the average 31,000 Oregon deaths 
every year.  Most important, there is still no suggestion that opponents fears of abuse have been 
realized in any way. 
 
 At present, Oregon remains the only American state where physician-assisted suicide is 
legal.  A Michigan attempt at passing an initiative, very quickly cobbled together after the 
success in Oregon, was soundly defeated at the polls in 1998.  A better organized initiative effort 
in Maine in 2000 was also defeated, but by a margin of only 49 to 51 percent.  In 2002, Hawaii 
came close to being the first state to have physician-assisted suicide legalized by a state 
legislature rather than by popular initiative process.  As this is written, legalization efforts, 
through legislation or the initiative process are being mounted and planned in several states. 
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7. Current Political Efforts to Undo Protection of the “Right to Die.” 
 
 Frustrated in their efforts to undo the Oregon experiment in that state’s legislature and the 
federal courts, opponents of legalization of physician-assisted suicide were forced to resort to the 
national legislature and executive branch.  In 1998, U.S. Congressman Henry Hyde proposed 
legislation (“The Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act”80) that would have amended the federal 
Controlled Substances Act to remove Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) prescription authority 
from any physician who “has intentionally dispensed or distributed a controlled substance with a 
purpose of causing, or assisting in causing, the suicide or euthanasia of any individual.”  This 
would have denied any Oregon physician who prescribed a controlled substance under the Death 
with Dignity Act the right to prescribe controlled substances for any purpose.  The bill was never 
passed into law, in great part because of opposition from the American medical community 
which feared putting the federal government in charge of deciding whether physicians who 
prescribed pain medication for dying patients were doing it merely to control pain or also to 
shorten life.  For similar reasons, a modified version of the bill, called the “Pain Relief 
Promotion Act”81 and proposed in the Congress in 1999, was never enacted into law.  In the face 
of those legislative defeats, newly-elected President Bush’s Attorney General, John Ashcroft, 
issued a directive that made it unnecessary to amend the Controlled Substances Act. On 
November 6, 2001, he advised the American medical community that the Department of Justice 
would interpret the act as already prohibiting use of controlled substances for physician-assisted 
suicide on the ground that assisting suicide was not a “legitimate medical purpose” within the 
meaning of the statute and related regulations.82  However, the Attorney General’s directive 
never achieved its intended effect.  Immediately challenged in federal court in Oregon on 
constitutional and statutory grounds, the directive’s operation was suspended by the issuance of 
an injunction83  which was affirmed in May of 2004 by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.84  On January 17, 2006, the United States Supreme Court put a final end to Ashcroft’s 
end run around the legislature, holding (by a 6 to 3 vote), that the Attorney General’s directive 
went beyond the authority granted him by Congress under the Controlled Substances Act.85
 
 In the national effort to undo the progress made in the “right to die” movement over the 
last thirty years, reactionary forces have appealed to the legislative and executive branches in the 
states as well.  Ironically, one of the most prominent recent instances of such an effort is 
reminiscent of Quinlan – the case where the movement all began.  Like Karen Quinlan, Terri 
Schiavo was a woman whose continuance on life support had become the subject of highly-
publicized litigation. In 1990, when she was 26 years old and residing in Florida with her 
husband, Mrs. Schiavo suffered a cardiac arrest from what doctors believe was a potassium 
imbalance, and she was ultimately diagnosed as being in a permanent vegetative state. She had 
never executed a living will or health care proxy, but Florida law provided that her husband 
should serve as her proxy decision-maker, and he reported that conversations with her made 
clear to him that she would prefer to have artificial nutrition and hydration removed and be 
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permitted to die a natural death. Mrs. Schiavo’s parents, Robert and Mary Schindler, publicly 
disputed both the diagnosis of permanent vegetative state and the conclusion that their daughter 
would prefer to be dead.  The matter was then taken to court for resolution of the factual 
disputes.  On four separate occasions, the courts of Florida had ruled against the parents.86  As 
the Schindlers lost in the courts, however, they gained national publicity for their cause and drew 
the support of various right to life groups who, among other things, promoted a massive 
campaign of protest letter writing to the Florida state legislature and Florida Governor Jeb Bush.  
In response to the letters, the Florida legislature, on October 21, 2003, took the unprecedented 
step of passing a law that authorized Governor Bush to issue a stay of the court orders, and 
Governor Bush immediately granted the stay.  Mr. Schiavo then filed suit in the courts of Florida 
to have the statute and Governor Bush’s action declared a violation of both the Florida and U.S. 
constitutions.  On May 5, 2004, the Florida circuit court held the stay to be unconstitutional.87  
On September 23, that decision was unanimously affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida in an 
opinion that reproved Governor Bush and the Florida legislature for violating principles of 
separation of powers by claiming the ability to stay a judicial proceeding.88   
 
 The Schindlers and their right to life allies then trained their efforts on the federal 
government.  First, they attempted an appeal to the United States Supreme Court from the 
decision of the Florida court.  However, on January 24, 2005, the high. Court refused review.  
The Florida decisions had been based upon state law and the state constitution, and they 
presented no proper federal question to be reviewed by the Court.  Thereafter, the Schindlers 
brought political power to bear on the U.S. Congress and the President of the United States.  On 
March 8, 2005, a Republican representative from Florida, David Weldon, introduced legislation 
aimed at continuing the artificial feeding of Mrs. Schiavo.  After two weeks of highly publicized 
debate in both houses of the Congress, including an extraordinary and pointed Senate session on 
Palm Sunday, the Congress passed and the President signed, on March 21,89 a “private bill” that 
purported to authorize the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Florida to hear the 
Schindler claims that had already been  rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court and to require the 
court to issue an order that the artificial feeding be continued.  When suit was filed in the 
designated court the next day, the judge refused to issue the requested order to continue Mrs. 
Schiavo’s feeding, finding there was no valid federal legal basis for doing so.  Over the 
following weeks, the Schindlers brought repeated suits and appeals to the state courts and federal 
courts in Florida, to the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit (which includes 
Florida) and the to the Supreme Court of the United States.  All of these efforts were held to be 
without merit.  On March 31, 2005, Mrs. Schiavo finally died.  An autopsy was ordered, and, on 
May 17, the Medical Examiner issued a report concluding that Mrs. Schiavo’s condition was 
consistent the diagnosis that she was in a permanent vegetative state and that, in any event, the 
                                                          
86 See Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So.2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Schindler v. Schiavo, 792 So.2d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2001); Schindler v. Schiavo, 800 So.2d 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); and Schindler v. Schiavo, 851 So.2d 182 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2003). 
87 Schiavo v. Bush, 2004 WL 980028 (Fla.Cir.Ct., May 5, 2004). 
88 Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So.2d 321 (2004). 
89 S.686, An act for the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo. 
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damage to her brain was irreversible:  “No amount of therapy or treatment would have 
regenerated the massive loss of neurons.”90
 
 In the end, the only winners coming out of the Schiavo affair appear to have been the 
courts.  As a result of performing in a fashion that suggested they remained steadfastly true to the 
law while being placed under enormous political pressure, the judges involved seem to have 
bolstered the reputation of the judiciary.  The U.S. Congress and President did not fare so well.  
A Harris Poll released on April 15, 2005 reported that 58% of the people polled disapproved of 
how the Congress handled the case and 51% disapproved of how President Bush handled it.91  
The Congress’ involvement of the Schiavo affair was made an issue in the November 2006 
midterm elections, and it may well have played a role in the Democrats winning majorities in 
both the House and the Senate. However, national right to life organizations have exploited the 
publicity surrounding the case as a basis for having the legislatures of Florida, Alabama, and 
Georgia consider legislation that would restrict the right to refuse life-prolonging treatment 
within the narrowest constitutional bounds consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Quill.92
 
8. Conclusion 
 
 As with most areas of American law, that dealing with the “right to die” is in a state of 
flux. There are a number of lines of tension at work in this development.  The most obvious are 
ideological ones that currently permeate American politics in which traditional constitutional and 
common law principles of individual liberty are regularly placed in conflict with pressures 
toward religious and moral conformity. For a variety of reasons, the more political branches of 
government in the United States seem at present to be particularly vulnerable to the pressures of 
religious and moral conformism.  However, American courts have, for the most part, continued 
to play their traditional role of moderating extreme influences of the moment and protecting 
traditions of individual liberty in many areas of the law, including that regarding “the right to 
die.” There are no signs that this tension will be significantly reduced in the near future. 
                                                          
90 Medical Examiner, District Six, Pasco & Pinellas Counties, Florida, Report of Autopsy, Theresa Schiavo, Case 
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91 Harris Poll, April, 2005, Harris Interactive.. 
92 See, for example, Alabama House Bill 104 (2004). 
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